| Historical Sikh Events: The Sikhs and the Independence Movement |
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The Sikhs and the Independence Movement Indian nationalism emerged in the later nineteenth century, and by the end of the first World War the movement for independence was becoming a major force in public life. During the decade from 1919 to 1929, there were waves of protest against the British that were unprecedented in extent, duration, and intensity. The decade ranged from the Amritsar meeting of the Indian National Congress (in the aftermath of the Rowlatt Act and Jallianwala Bagh massacre, and in anticipation of the Non-Cooperation campaign which grew from the activist programs of Khilafatism and Gandhian Satyagraha) to the Lahore Congress which adopted the memorable resolution that called for purna swaraj. Yet it was also an era marked by major constitutional advance. The politics of protest, prompted by grievous causes and moving to direct action, at times displaced -- but never replaced -- the moderate politics of constitutional discussion. The era was one in which "the Raj . . . found new moderates with whom to deal, men whose caste and communal rivalries with other Indians inclined them to work with the British. This hardly required any contrivance on the part of the rulers. Like a croupier, the Raj made contracts with one player after another; but as the one turned aside, the next always made his way to the table."[1] Constitutional politics, like the politics of protest, was both generated by and generative of competition and collaboration. The Punjab, a province which had a Muslim communal majority that could be held in check when Hindus and Sikhs worked in combination, tested the limits of the three communities and of the two kinds of politics in the Indian independence movement -- the limits of the effectiveness of electoral agreements and the limits of the commitment to non-violent protest. In the decade from 1919 to 1929, political patterns were established there which were replicated later in the process leading to India's independence, in the 1930s and the 1940s, and even beyond. Constitutional Advance and Communal Electorates The controversy generated by dissatisfaction in India over the Statutory Commission's members and its work became so great that, over Sir John Simon's objections, Viceroy Irwin was authorized to announce that the British government would invite representatives from India to attend a conference in England for a full discussion of constitutional issues. The 31 October 1929 announcement also indicated that the discussion would include the prospect of a federation of British India with the Indian States. This led in fact to a series of three conferences in London between November 1930 and December 1932. At the first of these Round Table Conferences there were 89 delegates, with 57 from British India, 16 representatives of Parliament, and 16 from the Princely States. But because the Indian National Congress had launched a campaign of civil disobedience against the government, it went unrepresented. Lacking participation by the Congress and preoccupied with the problems of creating an Indian federation, the first conference adjourned in January 1931 without making appreciable progress on the crucial question of communal representation. The second Round Table Conference got off to an uncertain start in September 1931. Mahatma Gandhi attended as the sole representative of the Congress, the Princes were evidently reluctant to enter into a federation, and the communal question blocked progress for British India. Of the enlarged membership of 114 at this second conference, 51 were appointed to the Minorities Committee which was charged with the responsibility to formulate a recommendation concerning communal representation and procedures to protect the rights of minorities. The Muslim members of the Minorities Committee demanded that separate, communal electorates must be preserved. They proposed that seats in the legislatures of the Muslim-majority provinces of the Punjab and Bengal should be based on the actual population ratios there, while seats in provinces in which Muslims were in a minority should be based on the negotiated ratios which were weighted favorably toward Muslims and which dated back to the pact between the Congress and the Muslim League signed in Lucknow in 1916. The Sikhs had not been party to that pact and did not favor preserving the weightage for Muslim minorities, partly because they themselves suffered the irony of being a minority of significant standing in the Punjab and yet of having not been accorded a strength of representation equivalent to that given to Muslims in those provinces in which the latter were in a minority. The British feared a communal deadlock which would make constitutional
advance impossible, and they sought to win the cooperation of the Muslim
delegates. Already at the end of the first conference the British had
proposed that Sind should be separated from Bombay as a Governor's province,
and at the end of the second conference the Prime Minister declared that
the North- West Frontier as well would be made a Governor's province.
Elevation of these two Muslim-majority regions to full provincial status
was expected to have strong appeal for that community's delegates. Yet
they sustained their demand for communal electorates and gained support
from the Hindu depressed classes, the Anglo-Indians, and a section of
the Indian Christians -- each of which found it to advantage to conjoin
their own claims with those of the Muslims. The Sikhs, the Congress, and
the Hindu Mahasabha together proposed the abolition of communal electorates.[2]
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